When the current round of hostilities engulfed the Israel-Lebanon border in flames these past few weeks, the foreign ministries of the world fell into two broad camps: those who saw a unique opportunity to quickly neutralize a potent anti-Western political force in the region and those who reflexively defended the actions of an actor who was plainly a proxy for the Revolutionary Guard in Iran.
Both warring parties clearly miscalculated. However, if one digs deeper into the nuances of the chatter coming from various foreign policy quarters, it is now becoming clear that both of the belligerent’s sponsors, the United States and Iran have an endgame that actually required both of the warring parties to miscalculate. Here's why.
The United States has actively worked to rid Lebanon of Syrian and Iranian influences for many months. Our diplomatic maneuvering following the assassination of Rafik Hariri deftly brought about the removal of Syria's military and intelligence assets. That left Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor as the last hurdle to establishing a stable, pro-Western friend to the north of Israel. The removal of Hezbollah from Lebanon would also weaken Iran as we sought to tighten the diplomatic noose on Iran's nuclear program.
The Israelis had been planning the current military campaign for months. They simply needed a pretext to initiate the campaign to eliminate their last "hot" border. If successful, it would have provided the nation with a level of security not seen since its formation as a nation state. The Bush administration, sensing that the time was right, placated the Israelis with visions of a lightning victory and rose pedals falling on triumphant tank crews from the grateful citizens from Tyre to Sidon. And so, the Israelis initiated a massive air campaign to destroy the few thousand rudimentary Katyushas known to be possessed by the militia to be followed several weeks later by a mopping up campaign to root out the last few Shiite militiamen who might survive the air war.
Two things happened that changed the equation.
First, Hezbollah possessed two secret weapons which neutralized Israel's vast military superiority. The Hezbollah missile arsenal was far greater in size and scope, and protected from air assault, than Israel's intelligence agencies had predicted. Essentially, Hezbollah possessed a strategic weapon that had the capacity to disrupt the economy and security of the northern third of Israel for months. Unfortunately for both Hezbollah and Israel (not to mention the civilians of Israel and Lebanon) a strategic weapon is only useful as a deterrent if your opponent knows you possess your weapon and understands its ability to inflict harm to your interests. Hezbollah failed to properly “educate” the Israelis about the capacity of its arsenal and the IDF analytical eye glazed over with a jaundiced belief in the myth of its invincibility. This lapse of judgment was no doubt influenced by the fact that Israeli forces had become complacent by years of “soft” conflict with the vastly inferior Palestinian militias.
Second, Hezbollah had taken possession of hundreds, if not thousands of sophisticated Russian and French anti-armor weapons which eviscerated the IDF’s ability to follow up its air campaign with an overwhelming ground response without suffering vast battlefield losses. This fear prevented the army from quickly moving in to neutralize the missile threat when air power alone proved inadequate. Some of these anti-tank missiles certainly came from Iranian warehouses. Others came from unknown sources. Ironically, the Israelis were themselves saved from possible extinction during the Yom Kippur (or Ramadan) War when the Nixon Administration secretly flew hundreds of cutting edge TOW missiles to Israel as its infantry were in the process of being overwhelmed by Syrian tank forces. The deliveries were decisive in turning the course of the war on the Northern front.
It is important to note that Hezbollah possessed other advanced weapons (such as Chinese Silkworm anti-ship missiles) which were useful but not critical to altering the strategic military balance.
Next, as a result of the gross incompetence of the IDF general staff to anticipate the threats and their inability to develop a timely response plan, the IDF was left with the unimaginative and self-defeating response of leveling Shiite civilian neighborhoods to “punish” Lebanon for allowing Hezbollah to exist. This, of course, created international outrage and ultimately forced the hand of the Bush Administration to bring things to a rather awkward stalemate.
On the surface, the current ceasefire and planned infusion of a robust French military force at the border, appears to be a piecemeal and ad hoc response to an unpredicted outcome. However, some foreign policy moderates have long called for the infusion of a strong multi-national force to be inserted between the warring parties at the border. The Israelis refused because they believed that such a force would hamper their ability of operate with impunity in the affairs of their northern neighbor. Additionally, the Israelis have long been wary of the role of France in the affairs of Lebanon, which has cultural ties to the region dating back to the Crusades and has not been particularly friendly with the Jewish state since the halcyon days of cooperation in the 1950s (e.g., Suez crisis, Algeria and nuclear research cooperation). Now, we see a situation developing in which the Israelis are acquiescing to a strong force on their northern border which will realize both fears. One wonders what role other Western nations played in helping “convince” the Israelis to accept the current UN mandate.
The Israelis were certainly not the only ones to miscalculate. Hezbollah likely envisioned their daring raid into Israel proper to capture two soldiers as a “message” to the Israelis and Americans that they still controlled Lebanon and to raise their popularity with the Sunni-led Hamas movement in the Territories. They expected a hard-hitting but limited Israeli response.
It is unlikely that their Iranian sponsors were as miscalculating. All out war between Hezbollah and the IDF served Iranian interests in several ways. It demonstrated that Iran has the wherewithal to strike against Western interests in powerful ways should the United States move towards a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. It demonstrated that current Iranian military hardware and Revolutionary Guard asymmetric battle tactics can be effective against the overwhelming air superiority of a Western military. Lastly, it was likely intended as a wake up call to American military forces in Iraq that the currently sedate Shiite population could turn into a potent threat to the our military in that country should we attempt to use Iraq as a launching ground against Iranian nuclear facilities. The Iranian mullahs may have decided it may have been an acceptable loss to lose Hezbollah if it meant protecting their own strategic interests, namely to remain in power and to field a nuclear deterrent force.
What are we to make of such developments if my assertions are accurate? Perhaps it is this: being a proxy for someone else has its privileges but they come at a very heavy cost.
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